Abstrct. Control is a critical concept for successful management and performance of international joint ventures (IJUs). This paper reviews and synthesizes prior studies addressing the conceptualization and operationalization of control within IJVs, as well as the IJV control-performance relationship. The paper also presents a new conceptualization of IJV control, as well as a conceptual framework for studying control of IJVs. 
the use of power, authority [Etzioni 1965 ] and a wide range of bureaucratic, cultural and informal mechanisms [Baliga & Jaeger 1984] . Control plays an important role in the capacity of a firm to achieve its goals. Typically, as organizations expand in size, there are concurrent increases in the complexity and differentiation of their structures [Lawrence & Lorsch 1967] , as well as in the risks of conflicts, opportunistic behavior and competing goals between units. As a result, top management are confronted by the increasingly crucial need to monitor, coordinate and integrate the activities of the organization's business units, including IJVs [Child 1977; Mintzberg 1979] . The importance of the issue of control explains why, for many years, scholars have devoted attention to this concept's role in the management of organizations [Etzioni 1961 In contrast, the issue of control of IJVs has received relatively scant attention. The topic of IJV control was first raised by West [1959] , who recognized the potential inter-partner conflicts which could result from this form of organization. According to West, without effective control efforts, firms were likely to experience great difficulty in managing JVs. Yet, despite this early observation regarding its importance, the issue of control has received only fragmented and unsystematic attention in the JV literature. More than ten years passed between West's initial observations and the re-emergence of the issue of control within the JV literature. Moreover, as discussed below, these subsequent research efforts have largely examined very different dimensions of IJV control, and no explicit attempts have been made to provide an integrative approach to the issue. The first dimension of IJV control which researchers have examined is the mechanisms by which control may be exercised. Initial studies showed that firms frequently relied on majority ownership or on voting control (in turn, largely determined by majority equity shareholdings) to achieve effective management control of an IJV's activities rfomlinson 1970; Friedman & Beguin 1971; Stopford & Wells 1972] . Although these studies showed that a majority position in equity or votes could ensure some degree of control 238 
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over the venture, the same argument might not be valid for IJVs where the equity was equally divided between parents or in which a firm had only a minority participation role. This latter situation especially concerned firms that, over time, were unable to demand full or dominant ownership positions in many international investments. With continued diffusion of technology, increased scale and risk accompanying new projects, increased globalization of many industries and host government policies promoting local equity participation in order to obtain resources or market access, the option of implementing wholly-owned or dominant ownership ventures has often been constrained [Moxon & Geringer 1985; Porter & Fuller 1986] . In addressing such concerns, Behrman [1970] as well as Friedman and Beguin [1971] suggested that control was not a strict and automatic consequence of ownership. According to these studies, a variety of mechanisms were available to firms for exercising effective IJV control: right of veto, representation in management bodies and special agreements related to either technology (e.g., licensing) or management (e.g., management services). Companies might also be able to rely on their technical superiority and managerial skills as a means of guaranteeing participation in the management of day-to-day operations. The nomination of one of a firm's managers as the IJV general manager [Rafii 1978 ], as well as employment of different ownership structure arrangements [Gullander 1976 ], could represent further means of exercising managerial control. In extending this stream of research, Schann [1983] demonstrated the breadth of mechanisms available to parent firms for exercising control over their IJVs (Table 1) . Among these control options, the JV board of directors, formal agreements, the appointment of key personnel, the JV planning process, the reporting relationships and a variety of informal mechanisms appeared to be particularly important for Schaan's sample. He also made a significant contribution to knowledge of IJV control by categorizing control mechanisms into two main types. Schaan distinguished positive control mechanisms, which parent firms employed in order to promote certain behaviors, from negative control mechanisms, which were used by a parent to stop or to prevent the IJV from implementing certain activities or decisions. Positive control was most often exercised through informal mechanisms, staffing, participation in the planning process and reporting relationships. In contrast, negative control relied principally on formal agreements, approval by parents and the use of the JV board of directors. These latter, negative forms of control exemplified what Child [1973] described as bureaucratic mechanisms. In addition to the mechanisms by which control may be exercised, a second dimension examined by scholars was the extent of control exercised over an IJV. Borrowing from organizational behavior research, most studies examining this latter dimension have conceptualized control as being dependent upon the centralization or the locus of the decisionmaking process. One such study was Dang's [1977] research on the autonomy of U.S. multinationals' subsidiaries in the Philippines annd Taiwan. Undoubtedly influenced by the Aston Group studies and the stream of research on centralization/ decentralization/autonomy in large organizations and multinationals, Dang defined control as the autonomy of a subsidiary and measured the construct with a decentralization index based on seventeen key decisions. Executives from parent companies and their subsidiaries were asked to evaluate the subsidiaries' degree of autonomy for these decisions along a three-point scale. Non-parametric tests failed to reveal any differences in control based on ownership, or between complete or joint ownership. As a result, Dang concluded that the tendency and degree of multinationals' control over their subsidiaries could not be explained by equity ownership and, thus, that wholly-owned subsidiaries were not more tightly controlled than JVs. Nevertheless, he observed a more frequent presence of multinationals' expatriate managers in JVs and, therefore, suggested that the control exercised over the JVs might be more important than indicated by his control index. Using a similar perspective, Killing [1983] As demonstrated by the preceding review, IJV control is a complex and multidimensional concept. Control is a much more subtle phenomenon than a proxy like centralization of decisionmaking is liable to capture, and it can be quite distinct from mere consideration of relative equity ownership or relative overall control of an IJV. In fact, as suggested by the above discussion, it is possible to distinguish three dimensions or parameters which comprise IJV control: (1) the focus of control, i.e., the scope of activities over which parents exercise control; (2) the extent or degree of control achieved by the parents; and (3) the mechanisms the parents use to exercise control. Contrary to initial appearances, these three parameters are not incompatible, but rather complementary and interdependent. They each examine a different aspect of IJV control. The main problem remains that most studies on IJV control have had a limited perspective of the control concept or have only looked at one of its dimensions. Only a few studies, in particular ones by Schaan [1983] and Geringer [1986] , have considered more than one parameter. However, it appears necessary to consider all three dimensions of control in order to obtain a thorough understanding of the control phenomenon for IJVs, although this integration has yet to be accomplished. In addition to simultaneously addressing control's three dimensions, another important step toward improved understanding of parent control of IJVs lies in the identification of the different types of control mechanisms, similar to Schaan [1983] . Researchers need to broaden the range of control mechanisms which managers may employ, as well as refining the operationalization of these various mechanisms. In pursuing this task, it may be valuable to acknowledge the differences in the orientation of control mechanisms. Borrowing Bartlett's [1986] terminology, the "mechanism" dimension may be broken down into three components. First, control mechanisms may be context-oriented. These mechanisms encompass a wide variety of informal and culture-based mechanisms and their essential purpose is to establish an organizational context appropriate for the achievement of parent company objectives. For example, firms frequently emphasize the IJV's development of a teamwork culture, rather than an "us-them" culture. This might be promoted by designating all personnel as employees of the IJV, rather than individual parent firms, and by promoting a set of policies that evidences consistency between individuals' motivations and the IJV's well-being. Such a culture may represent a very effective substitute to more formal or content-oriented mechanisms. In the case of this second dimension of control mechanisms, rather than relying on the organizational setting, parents rely on more direct interventions, either by top managers or by the IJV's board of directors. These mechanisms are typically bureaucratic in nature, or what Schaan [1983] termed "negative" control mechanisms. They include specification in the IJV agreement of veto rights or the assignment of selected responsibilities to each parent. The final dimension may be termed process-oriented mechanisms, in which parent firms exercise control through reporting relationships or influence on IJV planning and decisionmaking processes. For instance, parent firms may require the participation of their corporate staff in the IJV's strategic planning process. 
THE JOINT VENTURE CONTROL-PERFORMANCE RELATIONSHIP
To the extent that scholars have devoted attention to control in IJVs, the ultimate objective should not be limited to the study of the control concept itself. Rather, the underlying rationale should be improved understanding of the relationship of control to IJV performance. Thus, this section will review the approaches that have been employed in examining this critical relationship, as well as the studies' findings. Tomlinson [1970] , often considered the first scholar to empirically study the control-performance relationship for IJVs, did not directly examine parent control, but rather the "attitude of parents toward control." From a sample of seventy-one IJVs in India and Pakistan, Tomlinson found that IJVs evidenced higher levels of profitability when their U.K. parents assumed a more relaxed attitude toward control. However, the validity of these results may be questionable, since Tomlinson used return on investment as the measure of profitability. Utilization of this measure for a multi-industry sample does not appear adequate and may have produced bias in the results. Variations in the financial performance of IJVs could be caused, for example, by industry differences rather than differences in the attitude toward control. Although Franko [1971] It is open to conjecture whether these changes are indicative of modifications in the control of the JV, or of its poor performance. Despite these concerns, Franko made a significant contribution by examining the JV control-performance link using the "strategy-structure" conceptual framework. Within this perspective, the degree of parental control as well as the JV's performance (or its stability) is presumed to be contingent on the MNC's strategy and structure. Unfortunately, despite the potential insights from employing this framework, no researchers have yet attempted to extend Franko's work in studying the control-performance relationship for IJVs. The studies that constitute the "mainstream" of research on control and performance of IJVs have adopted a different, but not necessarily incompatible, approach than that employed by Franko [1971] . For example, Killing [1983] asserted that, among his three JV categories, dominant partner JVs are more likely to be successful, at least compared to shared management ventures. His argument was essentially as follows: since the presence of two (or more) parents constitutes the major source of management difficulties in JVs, dominant partner JVs, in which the venture's activities are dominated by a single parent, will be easier to manage and consequently more successful. This argument is especially easy to interpret within a transaction cost analytical framework, where transaction costs are defined as the costs assumed by firms for the enforcement, monitoring and administration of a transaction [Williamson 1981 Rafii [1978] , explained that the profitability of the JV for a parent firm is not based solely on the JV's profits, but also on transfer prices, royalties and management fees not included in traditional financial performance measures. Due to this deficiency, traditional fimancial measures were, consequently, judged to be inadequate for use within a JV context. Consistent with his hypothesis, Killing found that dominant partner JVs tended to be more successful, on both measures, than were shared management ventures. Independent JVs also exhibited superior levels of performance. In this latter case, Killing suggested that the JVs' autonomy was more a result than a cause of their performance. However, the evidence presented in support of this assertion was inconclusive. It did not completely rule out that autonomy, or the absence of parental control, was the stimulus rather than the response to higher JV performance. Furthermore, no formal statistical tests were used to support the assertion. Similar to Killing [1983] , Anderson and Gatignon [1986] proposed that entry modes offering greater control, as measured via the relative level of ownership, would be more efficient for highly proprietary products or processes. However, the work of other researchers has not provided much evidence to support Killing's [1983] Further analysis also demonstrated that dominant foreign control was significantly associated with unsatisfactory performance in four decisions (production scheduling, production process, quality control and replacement of managers) involving mainly production issues. Using the notion that parent firms seek control over specific activities as a conceptual starting point, Schaan [1983] extended that argument as well as identifying several subtleties regarding the phenomenon. In particular, Schaan concluded that venture success, or the extent to which parental expectations for the IJV were met, was a function of the fit among three variables: the parent's criteria for success, the activities or decisions it controlled and the control mechanisms which were utilized. He concluded that IJVs in which parents achieved this "fit" would evidence better performance. Schaan failed to provide details regarding the underlying rationale for his conclusions. However, one can imagine that a parent firm not adequately exercising control over activities judged as critical for the achievement of its objectives could ultimately suffer from ineffective strategy implementation and strategic inflexibility. Thus, despite its conceptual appeal, the relationship between dominant control and IJV performance appears to be far more complex and less direct than scholars may have originally perceived. Janger [1980] suggested that the organization of a JV has only a small direct influence on its performance. According to him, it would not be "the structure alone that makes for a successful organization, but how well the structure fits the strategy and power situation in the venture" (p. 32). Despite such comments, most prior research has been limited to a direct test of the IJV controlperformance relationship without taking account of or controlling for other variables such as the parents' strategy and structure, as Franko [1971] As previously discussed, prior research has been highly fragmented on the basis either of the conceptualization of IJV control, the object of study or the attention devoted to IJV performance (Table 2 ). In addition, clear understanding of the IJV control-performance relationship is constrained by apparent inconsistencies in results. As a first step toward solving these problems, we have previously proposed a conceptualization of control that takes into account its three different dimensions. The next step involves the development of an integrative approach for studying control in IJVs. To address this latter issue, two conceptual frameworks appear to be particularly useful. CDoc. [Anderson & Gatignon 1986 ]. It can also increase the risks to which a firm is exposed [Davidson 1982 ]. Consequently, the exercise of extensive control over an IJV's activities and decisions can generate important coordination and governance costs and limit the efficiency of an alliance [Contractor & Lorange 1988 ]. This may be especially true for control efforts oriented toward activities and decisions having little importance for performance of either the IJV or the parent firm. Therefore, the critical issue for a parent firm is to exercise control, in terms of mechanisms, extent and focus, over an IJV in such a manner that will enable it to successfully implement its strategy without incurring a level of administrative or organizational inefficiencies which outweighs the gains from its cooperative endeavor. In other words, there is a strategy-structure "fit" when the benefits outweigh the costs of control, and this "fit" is best when the margin between benefits and costs is optimized. This rationale is readily illustrated by Franko's [19711 results. In the case of a product diversification (or national responsiveness) strategy, the foreign parent may perceive the need to exercise at least a moderate level of control over the IJV in order to protect its interests and to ensure effective strategy implementation. However, the extent of control that the foreign partner attempts to exercise may limit the autonomy and flexibility of the IJV and its local management, hindering the venture's ability to respond to local market demands and generating a level of transaction costs that may offset the strategy's potential benefits. It is from this perspective that we propose a model for the study of IJV control ( 
CONCLUSIONS
As corporations increasingly utilize alliances such as IJVs as tools for attaining strategic objectives, the issue of IJV control is experiencing a corresponding increase in attention from academics and practitioners alike. Yet, understanding of IJV management lags behind the demands of practice. Although a wide variety of control mechanisms have been identified, managers have received minimal guidance about when and how to use them, as well as about the potential tradeoffs between alternative control options. As a result, many firms have chosen to bypass the IJV option or have entered ventures ill-prepared. These firms may not only be missing potentially valuable opportunities, they may ultimately be eliminating themselves as viable contenders within entire industries. This concern is particularly critical when it affects participation within highly competitive global (or globalizing) industries. In addressing control of IJVs, this paper has attempted to bring into focus a critical variable influencing venture development and performance, and to provide a base for improved understanding and management of IJVs. Review of the literature leaves no doubt that control is a crucial organizational process, for IJVs as well as for any other organizational form. It is also a complex and multidimensional concept. This feature may help explain why researchers have used different approaches to study control in IJVs. These differences, as shown in this paper, are particularly evident in the conceptualization and operationalization of control. In addition, due to variations among, and weaknesses of, prior measures of IJV performance, many conclusions from these previous studies have to be interpreted with some degree of caution. Furthermore, the empirical component of many studies is not without its shortcomings. Methodological issues such as differences in the object of study and in dependent variables may constitute potentially serious threats to the external validity of many, if not all, prior studies of IJV control. Differences in research approaches are also evident in the frameworks or rationales used to link parent control to IJV performance. The review of the literature provided in this paper illustrates that the development of JV theory, specifically for the issue of control, has not reaped the full benefits possible from cross-fertilization with theoretical developments within other disciplines. In particular, developments in both transaction cost theory and the strategy-structure model appear particularly relevant for examining this relationship. Consequently, research opportunities regarding control in IJVs are numerous. Many opportunities remain for further research stressing theory development and testing, particularly for JVs in developed countries. The objective of this paper was to assist in this endeavor by synthesizing prior research on IJV control. The identification of three underlying dimensions of control-focus, extent and mechanisms-as well as three orientations which control mechanisms may evidence, should be valuable in improving the design of future research. Similarly, discussion of a conceptual framework of IJV control should further enhance development of JV theory, specifically as it concerns control and performance of IJVs.
